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Abstract—We address Bayesian persuasion between a sender
and a receiver with state-dependent quadratic cost measures
for general classes of distributions. The receiver seeks to make
mean-square-error estimate of a state based on a signal sent
by the sender while the sender signals strategically in order to
control the receiver’s estimate in a certain way. Such a scheme
could model, e.g., deception and privacy, problems in multi-
agent systems. Existing solution concepts are not viable since
here the receiver has continuous action space. We show that for
finite state spaces, optimal signaling strategies can be computed
through an equivalent linear optimization problem over the cone
of completely positive matrices. We then establish its strong
duality to a copositive program. To exemplify the effectiveness of
this equivalence result, we adopt sequential polyhedral approxi-
mation of completely-positive cones and analyze its performance
numerically. We also quantify the approximation error for a
quantized version of a continuous distribution and show that a
semi-definite program relaxation of the equivalent problem could
be a benchmark lower bound for the sender’s cost for large state
spaces.
Index Terms—Stackelberg games, Signaling, Bayesian persua-
sion, Deception, Privacy, Copositive Programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
TO induce intelligent decision makers to take certainactions, we can create incentives via external means,
e.g., explicit payments, but we can also persuade them to
take the actions by their own will without the need for any
external means if we can craft the information available to
them. In the field of economics, such a problem of interest has
been examined by Kamenica and Gentzkow in their seminal
paper [1]. In particular, they have introduced the “Bayesian
persuasion” problem between a sender and a receiver, where
the sender crafts the signal sent to the receiver in order
to induce the receiver to take a certain action while the
receiver is aware of how the signal is crafted (e.g., due
to committed transparency/honesty). They have provided a
geometrical interpretation of the optimal persuasive signaling
strategy and examined the persuasion capability of the sender.
A detailed justification of the sender’s policy commitment can
be found in [1] and a recent survey of literature on Bayesian
persuasion could be found in [2].
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Applications that can be modeled within Bayesian persua-
sion framework are not limited to the field of economics,
since information sharing is a common theme also in multi-
agent communication (and control) systems. Further, in non-
cooperative multi-agent systems, (selfish) agents with diverse
objectives are likely to have tendency to share information
strategically. Correspondingly, strategic signaling has attracted
significant attention also in the fields of communication and
control, recently, with a specific focus on state-dependent
quadratic cost measures (due to their wide applicability in
communication and control systems). However, these studies
have mainly focused on Gaussian information models [3]–[9]
(different from the literature in economics [1], [10]–[12] and
computer science [13], [14]).
In [3], the authors have shown that a certain linear signaling
strategy is optimal provided that sender commits to a signaling
policy beforehand and receiver has bounded rationality by
using linear estimates only. Indeed, for the same settings of [3],
in [4], the author had shown that the linear signaling strategy
is optimal even when the receiver is completely rational by
selecting any measurable decision policy. We note that without
the policy commitment of the sender, there does not exist a
Nash equilibrium where the sender selects a linear signaling
strategy. For example, an early reference [15] had shown1 that
there only exists partition (Nash) equilibrium (where sender
sends a quantized version of the state) if there is no policy
commitment. Under the same settings with [3] yet for a
completely rational receiver, [5] has shown the optimality of
linear signaling strategies when there is an additive Gaussian
noise channel and the sender has a hard power constraint.
Contrary to the noiseless channel scenarios, however, when
there is no policy commitment, in [6] the authors have shown
that under certain conditions the sender can also have a linear
signaling strategy at a (Nash) equilibrium if there is an additive
Gaussian noise channel and the sender has a soft power
constraint on the signal sent.
In our previous papers [7]–[9], we have studied the strategic
signaling problem described above in dynamic environments
over a finite horizon. For discrete-time (multivariate) Gauss
Markov processes, in [7] we have shown the optimality of lin-
ear signaling strategies within the general class of measurable
policies and formulated an equivalent semi-definite program
(SDP), which enables computation of the optimal signaling
1In [15], the authors have focused only on compact state spaces and quite
general class of cost measures including, but not limited to, quadratic costs.
Later, [6] has shown that the result can be generalized to settings where the
state is drawn according to a Gaussian distribution (which does not have a
compact support) and players have quadratic cost measures.
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Fig. 1: An illustration of Bayesian persuasion with state-
dependent quadratic cost measures when the state could con-
sist of two types of information. Within the context of decep-
tion, the sender could seek to induce the receiver to perceive
the information of interest as the private information. Within
the context of privacy, the sender could seek to share the
information of interest without leaking the private information
since it might be inferred from the information of interest
shared, due to the correlation between them.
strategies numerically through existing SDP solvers. For non-
cooperative linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control problems,
in [8], we have formulated optimal linear signaling strategies
of a sensor who seeks to deceive a private-type controller in
settings where the distribution over the types of the controller
is not known. And reference [9] provides an overview of the
results of [7] and [8] from the viewpoint of security in cyber-
physical systems.
For Gaussian information, we can obtain well structured
results, e.g., optimality of linear signaling strategies, also in
dynamic and noisy environments, as shown in the studies
reviewed above. However, for distributions other than Gaus-
sian, we still have significant but not completely explored
problems. Notably, for general distributions with compact
support, [1] brings in a geometrical interpretation into the
problem, which requires the computation of a convex envelope
of a function, which can be prominently challenging even for
finite yet relatively large state spaces [16]. We also note that,
as studied in [10]–[12], a relatively simpler characterization
of the solution is possible for a special class of Bayesian
persuasion problem, e.g., where the sender’s cost measure does
not depend on the state.
There have also been computational approaches for the
Bayesian persuasion problem, e.g., [13], [14]. Particularly,
the non-strategic nature of the receiver makes it possible to
formulate the problem as a single optimization problem faced
by the sender. For scenarios where the receiver has a finite
action space, based on the revelation principle, the authors
have formulated a linear program (LP)2 to compute the optimal
signaling strategy, which, however, turns out to be impractical
to solve numerically unless the finite state and action spaces
are small [13], [14]. Therefore the authors consider the scenar-
ios where the players’ cost measures are independently (and
identically) drawn from a known distribution for each state,
and examine connections with auction theory.
2This LP has a computational complexity polynomial with the size of the
state space and the receiver’s action space.
In this paper, our goal is to address Bayesian persua-
sion with state-dependent quadratic cost measures for general
classes of distributions. More explicitly, we consider the
scenario where a sender has access to a realization (called
state) of a random variable (with commonly known statistical
profile) while a receiver seeks to compute Bayesian (possibly
nonlinear) estimate of the state in the mean-square-error sense
based on the signal he/she receives. However, the sender
constructs the signal strategically in a stochastic way in order
to manipulate the receiver’s perception according to another
state-dependent quadratic cost measure. This scheme, for
example, could address optimal signaling in various scenarios
within the context of deception and privacy, depending on
how we configure the underlying state and state-dependent
quadratic cost measures, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Since the receiver forms his/her perception according to
the Bayesian estimate, the sender can compute his/her best
signaling strategy by solving an optimization problem that
incorporates the receiver’s best response. However, quite
contrary to the scenarios studied in [13], here the sender
cannot exploit the revelation principle to turn the optimization
problem he/she faces into a (finite) LP since the receiver’s
action set is the convex hull of the state space, i.e., it is
a continuum even when the underlying state space is finite,
except the trivial case when the state space is a singleton.
Further, the optimization problem faced by the sender turns
out to be non-convex and highly non-linear.
One of our contributions in this paper is to exploit the
quadratic structure of the cost measures in order to transform
the problem faced by the sender into a structured and ex-
ploitable form. To this end, for finite state spaces, we formulate
an equivalent linear optimization problem over the convex
cone of completely positive matrices3. We further formulate a
semi-definite relaxation of this equivalent problem, which can
be solved effectively for relatively large state spaces. And the
SDP-relaxation turns out to be tight if the size of the state
space is less than or equal to 4. Furthermore we show that the
strong dual of the equivalent problem is a linear optimization
problem over the cone of copositive matrices4. Therefore the
sender could choose to solve either one while computing the
optimal signaling strategy.
The equivalence relation established is of importance be-
cause optimization over the cone of completely positive (or
copositive) matrices is an active research area where the
compact structure of the cones is approximated via polyhedral
or semi-definite cones to any degree of accuracy at the expense
of computational complexity, e.g., see [18]–[23]. To exemplify
the effectiveness of the equivalence established, we examine
the performance of sequential polyhedral approximations, pro-
vided by [20], in the computation of optimal signaling. We
further compare our solution concept with the LP formulation
of Bayesian persuasion provided by [13] (with a quantized
version of the receiver’s action space) and the SDP-relaxation
3We say that a matrix Ξ ∈ Rn×n is completely positive if there exists an
(entry-wise) non-negative matrix B ∈ Rn×k+ such that Ξ = BB′ [17].
4We say that a symmetric matrix A ∈ Sn is copositive provided that
b′Ab ≥ 0 for all b ∈ Rn+ [17].
3formulated by [4] (which turns out to be tight for Gaussian
information) in various scenarios numerically.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
formulate the problem for the general class of distributions.
In Section III, we provide the main equivalence result and
discuss computational approaches. In Section IV, we compare
our approach to existing equivalent problem formulations. In
Section V, we provide illustrative numerical examples. We
conclude the paper in Section VI. An Appendix provides the
proofs of the three technical results.
Notation. We denote random variables by bold lower case
letters, e.g., x. Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters, e.g.,
Z . We denote the set of all probability distributions on a set
Z by ∆(Z). For a vector x and a matrix A, x′ and A′ denote
their transposes; further ‖x‖ and ‖A‖2 denote the Euclidean
(L2) norms of the vector x and the matrix A, respectively.
For a matrix A, tr {A} denotes its trace. We denote the
identity and zero matrices with the associated dimensions by
I and O, respectively. For positive semi-definite matrices A
and B, A  B means that A − B is also a positive semi-
definite matrix. Sm (or Sm+ ) denotes the set of symmetric
(or positive semi-definite) matrices of dimensions m-by-m
while Rn×m+ (or R
n×m
++ ) denotes the set of n-by-m matrices
with non-negative (or positive) entries. CPn ⊂ Rn×n and
COPn ⊂ Rn×n, respectively, denote the cone of completely
positive and copositive matrices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider two non-cooperating decision makers: a sender
(PS) and a receiver (PR), as seen in Fig. 1. PS has access to
an underlying state, which is realization of an m-dimensional
random vector z with (finite) support Z ⊂ Rm. Given the
realization z, PS sends a signal s ∈ S according to a stochastic
kernel, denoted by pi(s|z), i.e., pi(·|z) ∈ ∆(S) for each z ∈ Z .
Let us denote the set of all such signaling rules by Π, i.e.,
pi ∈ Π. On the other side, after a realization of the signal sent
is received, e.g., s ∈ S, PR selects her5 strategy γ(·) that is a
(Borel measurable) function from S to Z and her estimate of
the underlying state is given by zˆ = γ(s). The strategy space
of PR is denoted by Γ, which is the set of all (measurable)
functions from S to Z . We also define the random variable
zˆ := γ(s) almost everywhere over Z .
The decision makers select their strategies according to
distinct cost measures. PR seeks for the mean-square-error
estimate of the underlying state and has the cost measure6
cR(pi, γ) = E
{‖z − zˆ‖2} (1)
to be minimized via γ ∈ Γ. On the other side, PS has the
state-dependent quadratic cost measure
cS(pi, γ) = E
{[
z
zˆ
]′ [
Qzz Qzzˆ
Qzˆz Qzˆzˆ
] [
z
zˆ
]}
, (2)
5We use the pronouns “he” and “she” while referring to PS and PR,
respectively, only for clear referral.
6Note that the dependence of the estimate zˆ on the signaling rule pi ∈ Π
and the decision rule γ ∈ Γ is implicit for notational simplicity.
for some weight matrices Qzz, Qzzˆ, Qzˆz, Qzˆzˆ ∈ Rm×m, to be
minimized via pi ∈ Π.
The flexibility on the weight matrices in (2) enables us to
model various problems within the same framework described
above. For example, as illustrated in Fig. 1, suppose that
the underlying state consists of two types of information:
information of interest x ∈ X and private information y ∈ Y ,
i.e., z = (x, y). Let us denote the estimates of these two types
of information by xˆ and yˆ, accordingly.
Example (Deception). Consider the scenario where PS seeks
to induce PR to perceive x as y while PR seeks to estimate
the true value of x. Then, for this example, PS could have the
cost measure
cS(pi, γ) = E
{‖y − xˆ‖2} , (3)
which could be obtained from (2) provided that the weight
matrices are set as Qzz = [O OO I ], Qzzˆ = Q
′
zˆz =
[
O O
−I O
]
, and
Qzˆzˆ = [ I OO O ]. 
Example (Privacy). Consider the scenarios where random
variables x and y (that do not necessarily have the same
dimensions) are not independent of each other, and PS seeks
to share x ∈ X while minimizing the informational leakage of
y ∈ Y . Then for this example, PS could have the cost measure
cS(pi, γ) = E
{‖x − xˆ‖2}− E{‖y − yˆ‖2} , (4)
which could also be obtained from (2) with the weight matrices
set as Qzz =
[
I O
O −I
]
, Qzzˆ = Q′zˆz =
[−I O
O I
]
, and Qzˆzˆ =[
I O
O −I
]
. 
Under the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium [24],
policy commitment of PS implies that PS is the leader while
PR is the follower. Let B(pi) ⊂ Γ be the optimum reaction set
of the follower PR corresponding to a given strategy pi ∈ Π
of PS . Note that B(pi) is actually a singleton for any given
signaling strategy pi ∈ Π since the best reaction of PR is
unique and given by zˆ = E {z |s = s} (and correspondingly
zˆ = E {z |s} almost everywhere over Z). Then, the pair of the
strategy and the optimum reaction, (pi∗, B(pi∗)), attains the
Stackelberg equilibrium provided that
pi∗ ∈ argmin
pi∈Π
cS(pi,B(pi
∗)) (5a)
B(pi) = argmin
γ∈Γ
cR(pi, γ). (5b)
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we provide a solution concept for the
computation of optimal signaling strategies that attain the
Stackelberg equilibrium, as described in (5). Before delving
into the technical details, let us first provide an overview of the
main result of this paper: We start by identifying the optimiza-
tion problem faced by PS given the non-strategic machinery
of Bayesian estimation followed by PR. Then we show that
the optimization problem turns out to be highly nonlinear and
non-convex, which poses a challenge for solving it globally.
To mitigate this challenge, we formulate an equivalent linear
optimization problem over the cone of completely positive
matrices and show that its (strong) dual is a linear optimization
problem over the cone of copositive matrices.
4From a computational perspective, we formulate an SDP
relaxation of the equivalent problem and analyze its computa-
tional complexity. We further provide one computational ap-
proach adopted from the literature on copositive programming
to solve the optimal signaling problem effectively. Finally
we quantify the approximation level of adopting our solution
concept for a quantized version of a continuum state space.
In the following, we provide the technical details.
A. Optimization Problem Faced by PS
Since the best reaction of PR is uniquely given by zˆ =
E {z |s} almost everywhere over Z , the optimization problem
faced by PS , as defined in (2), can be written as
min
pi∈Π
cS(pi, γ
∗) = min
pi∈Π
[
E {z ′Qzzz}+ E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}]
(6)
= E {z ′Qzzz}+ min
pi∈Π
E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}
(7)
where
V := Qzzˆ +Qzˆz +Qzˆzˆ (8)
since we have E
{
zzˆ ′
}
= E
{
E
{
zzˆ ′|s}} = E{zˆzˆ ′}. And (7)
follows since the first term on the right-hand-side of (6) does
not depend on the optimization argument pi ∈ Π.
Example (Deception - Cont’d). Within the context of decep-
tion, the weight matrix in (6) is given by V =
[
I −I
−I O
]
. 
Example (Privacy - Cont’d). Within the context of privacy,
the weight matrix in (6) is given by V =
[−I O
O I
]
. 
Suppose that the prior distribution has complete support on
Z , n := |Z| and let po(z) ∈ (0, 1] denote the probability that
the state z ∈ Z is realized. Then Bayes rule yields that the
probability of state z ∈ Z being realized given that signal
s ∈ S is received is given by7
ps(z) :=
pi(s|z)po(z)
p(s)
, (9)
where p(s), denoting the probability that the signal s ∈ S is
sent, is given by
p(s) =
∑
z∈Z
pi(s|z)po(z). (10)
Therefore, for given s ∈ S, we have8
zˆ := E {z |s = s} =
∑
z∈Z
ps(z)z. (11)
Correspondingly, the optimization objective of PS , as de-
scribed in (7), could be written as
E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}
=
∑
s∈S
p(s)
(∑
z∈Z
ps(z)z
)′
V
(∑
z∈Z
ps(z)z
)
,
(12)
=
∑
s∈S
(∑
z∈Z pi(s|z)po(z)z
)′
V
(∑
z∈Z pi(s|z)po(z)z
)∑
z∈Z pi(s|z)po(z)
,
(13)
7A signal s ∈ S would be received if the associated probability is positive,
i.e., p(s) > 0.
8This shows that PR’s action set, i.e., the set of all possible posterior
estimates of the state, is the convex hull of Z , i.e., a continuum unless Z is
a singleton.
which is, in general, a highly nonlinear and nonconvex
function of the optimization argument pi ∈ Π (due to the
denominator term in (13)). Since a local solution can be
arbitrarily bad in a non-convex optimization problem, next we
formulate an equivalent problem for which a global optimum
could be computed via existing solvers effectively.
B. An Equivalent Linear Optimization Problem
Note that E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}
= tr
{
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
V
}
and we can write the
correlation matrix of the posterior state E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
in a compact
form as
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
= ZΞpiZ
′, (14)
where Z :=
[
z1 . . . zn
] ∈ Rm×n and we introduce Ξpi ∈ Sn
whose ith row and jth column entry is given by
Ξpi[i, j] =
∑
s∈S
p(s)ps(zi)ps(zj). (15)
Then, the problem faced by PS can be written as
min
pi∈Π
tr
{
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
V
}
= min
pi∈Π
tr
{
ΞpiV¯
}
, (16)
where V¯ := Z ′V Z.
The following proposition provides a concrete characteriza-
tion of a necessary and sufficient condition on Ξpi .
Proposition 1. For any signaling rule pi ∈ Π, the symmetric
matrix Ξpi satisfies Ξpi ∈ CPn and Ξpi1 = po.9 Furthermore
for any completely positive matrix Ξ that satisfies Ξ1 = p
o
,
there exists a signaling rule pi ∈ Π such that Ξpi = Ξ.
Consider a factorization10 of the completely positive matrix
Ξ, as Ξ∗ =
∑k
i=1 bib
′
i, where bi ∈ Rn+. Then, the correspond-
ing signaling strategy is given by11
pi∗(si|zj) = b′i1
bi,j
po(zj)
, (17)
for all i = 1, . . . , k and j = 1, . . . , n, where bi,j ≥ 0 denotes
the jth entry of the vector bi.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A. 
Based on Proposition 1, the following corollary shows that
the problem faced by PS could be written, “equivalently”,
as a linear optimization problem over the convex cone of
completely positive matrices.
Corollary 1. The problem faced by PS can be written in an
equivalent form as
min
pi∈Π
tr
{
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
V
}
= min
Ξ∈CPn
tr
{
ΞV¯
}
, (18)
s.t. Ξ1 = p
o
where V¯ = Z ′V Z.
9We define p
o
:=
[
po(z1) . . . po(zn)
]′.
10A completely positive matrix could have multiple different factorizations
even for the same k ∈ N [25]. This also yields that the corresponding signaling
strategy is not unique in general.
11Note that the prior distribution has complete support over Z by definition.
5The following proposition shows that given the primal
problem:
min
Ξ∈CPn
tr
{
ΞV¯
}
, s.t. Ξ1 = p
o
, (P)
its strong dual (with respect to trace inner product) is given
by
max
y∈Rn,S∈COPn
p′
o
y, s.t. 1y′ + S = V¯ . (D)
This enables us to solve either of them while obtaining the
value of both.
Proposition 2. The dual of (P) with respect to trace inner
product is given by (D). Furthermore, (P) is feasible, has
finite value, and has an interior point. Therefore, there exists
a strong duality between (P) and (D), i.e., we always have
(P) = (D).
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B. 
In the following subsections, we examine the equivalent
problem formulation from a computational perspective.
C. Semi-definite Program Relaxation
Note that CPn ⊆ Sn+ ∩Rn×n+ for all n, while CPn = Sn+ ∩
Rn×n+ if, and only if, n ≤ 4 [17], [26]. Based on this fact, the
following proposition provides an SDP relaxation of (P).
Proposition 3. An SDP relaxation of the primal problem (P)
is given by
min
Ξ∈Sn+
tr
{
ΞV¯
}
, s.t. Ξ1 = p
o
,Ξ ∈ Rn×n+ , (SDP)
and we always have (P) ≥ (SDP), with equality if n ≤ 4.
Due to the constraints Ξ1 = p
o
and Ξ ∈ Rn×n+ , it can
be shown that the maximum Frobenius norm of any feasible
solution of the SDP relaxation is bounded from above by 1.
Based on this observation and [27, Theorem 2.6.1], the follow-
ing corollary to Proposition 3 characterizes the computational
complexity of solving the SDP relaxation.
Corollary 2. There exists an algorithm that can solve (SDP)
up to any desired level of accuracy with run-time complexity
polynomial in the size of the state space.
D. Adopting Copositive Programming Methods
Based on the equivalence results provided above, we can
adopt existing computational tools that have been developed
for copositive programming in the optimization community,
e.g., [18]–[23]. Furthermore, each new development in this
active research area (due to its broad applications) will bring
in new computational tools and insights to address the optimal
signaling problem.
For example, we can approximate CPn through polyhedral
cones [20]–[22] from inside and outside of CPn such that
their (nested) sequence converges to CPn asymptotically.
For each polyhedral approximation, the corresponding op-
timization problem becomes an LP, which can be solved
in polynomial time. A comparison between inner and outer
approximations quantifies the accuracy of the approximation.
Furthermore, in [20], the authors have proposed an algorithm
that attains fine approximation only around some neighbor-
hood of the solution of the optimization problem while letting
the approximation be coarse anywhere else in order to speed
it up. In the following we briefly describe the algorithm since
we will adopt it to solve (P) and examine its performance
numerically in various scenarios in Section V.
Note that the extreme rays of CPn have rank 1, i.e., they
can be written as bb′, where b ∈ Rn+ [17]. Correspondingly,
CPn can be viewed as the conic hull of vectors from the unit
simplex ∆n−1 in Rn [22]. Consider a family of simplices
P = {∆1, . . . ,∆t} satisfying
∆n−1 =
t⋃
i=1
∆i and int
{
∆i
} ∩ int{∆j} = ∅ if i 6= j.
Given the family of simplices P , we define the polyhedral
cones:12
IP :=
∑
b∈VP
λbbb
′ : λb ≥ 0
 , (19)
OP :=
 ∑
b,c∈VP
λb,c(bc
′ + cb′) : λb,c ≥ 0
 , (20)
where VP denotes the set of vertices in P . In [20], the authors
have shown that IP ⊆ CPn ⊆ OP for any P . Let CP(K)
denote the solution of the following K-cone program:
CP(K) = min tr{ΞV¯ } (21)
s.t. Ξ1 = p
o
Ξ ∈ K
Since IP ⊆ CPn ⊆ OP , we have
CP(IP) ≥ CP(CPn) ≥ CP(OP). (22)
Correspondingly, through a sequence of simplical partitions,
we can construct a sequence of nested polyhedral cones I1 ⊆
I2 ⊆ . . . and O1 ⊇ O2 ⊇ . . . that converge to CPn, i.e.,
CPn =
⋃
i∈N
Ii and CPn =
⋂
i∈N
Oi, (23)
from below and above, respectively [20].
E. Approximation Guarantees for Continuum State Spaces
Up to now we have focused on finite state spaces. For
continuum state spaces, we can still adopt the solution concept
accompanied with a quantization scheme. The following corol-
lary to Proposition 1 quantifies the associated approximation
error in terms of the quantization error. Note that a smaller
quantization error can necessitate large number of quantization
bins, and therefore the associated problem might have a large
state space. In such cases, the error quantified can also be
incorporated into the SDP-relaxation since it can be solved
12The subscripts b and c denote the index of the associated vectors.
6via existing SDP solvers effectively for relatively large state
spaces.
Corollary 3. Consider a quantization of the continuous ran-
dom variable z ∈ Z , denoted by zq ∈ Z , i.e., zq attains the
same value within any bin of the quantization. Let e = z−zq ,
almost everywhere over Z , denote the quantization error.
Then, we have13∣∣∣min
s
tr
{
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
V
}−min
s
tr
{
E
{
zˆqzˆ
′
q
}
V
}∣∣∣ ≤ , (24)
where zˆ = E {z |s}, zˆq = E {zq|s}, and
 = (2‖zq‖+ ‖e‖)‖V ‖2‖e‖, (25)
which yields that  → 0 when ‖e‖ → 0. Furthermore, let nq
denote the number of bins in the quantization scheme. Then,
we also have
min
pi∈Π
tr
{
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
V
}
+ ≥ minΞ∈S
nq
+
tr
{
ΞV¯
}
s.t. Ξ1 = p
o
,Ξ ∈ Rnq×nq+ .
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix C. 
IV. OTHER EQUIVALENT PROBLEM FORMULATIONS
In this section, we compare our equivalent problem for-
mulation with other equivalent problems provided by [1],
[13], and [4] (in this order). Note that [1] and [13] are for
general classes of cost measures, whereas ours is exclusive
to state-dependent quadratic cost measures. Although [4] is
also for state-dependent quadratic cost measures, it is specific
to Gaussian distributions whereas ours is for any distribution
(with finite support).
A. A Continuous LP Based on Bayes Plausibility
In [1], the authors have shown that the sender could induce
a posterior belief p on the underlying state (or information)
via a signaling strategy if, and only if, the posterior belief is
Bayes plausible, i.e.,
∫
∆(Z) pτ(dp) = po, where τ denotes
the probability measure over the posterior beliefs induced
by the signaling strategy. Correspondingly if we let cˆS(p)
correspond to the cost of PS for the posterior belief p, then
the optimization problem faced by PS is equivalent to
min
τ∈∆(∆(Z))
∫
∆(Z)
cˆS(p)τ(dp) s.t.
∫
∆(Z)
pτ(dp) = po. (26)
In other words, PS can look for τ , a distribution over poste-
rior beliefs, in order to compute the best signaling strategy.
However τ is defined over ∆(∆(Z)), which is an infinite
dimensional space even for finite state spaces, where |Z| <∞.
Alternatively, in order to solve the equivalent problem (26),
[1] proposes a solution concept that uses convexification. In
13By turning the problem around, we can view it as PS selecting a random
vector within the general class of square integrable distributions and sending
a realization of that signal rather than selecting a signaling strategy. Note
that PS should take into account the joint distribution of the underlying
distribution and the signal sent, which would normally have been determined
by the signaling strategy.
particular, let C(p) be the convex envelope of cˆS(p), defined
by
C(p) ≡ inf{c|(p, c) ∈ co {cˆS}}, (27)
where co {cˆS} ⊂ ∆(Z) × R denotes the convex hull of
the graph of cˆS . Then its convex nature yields that the
minimum cost for PS is simply equal to C(po). However,
this necessitates the computation of a convex envelope in |Z|-
dimensional space, which is challenging for |Z| > 2, except
the trivial cases where cˆS turns out to be a convex or a concave
function.
In our problem setting, the cost for PS as a function of the
posterior belief p turns out to be neither convex nor concave
in general. Particularly, it is given by
cˆS(p) = tr
{
Z ′V Zpp′
}
, (28)
and Sylvester’s law of inertia yields that Z ′V Z is not necessar-
ily a definite matrix since V is not necessarily a definite matrix,
as exemplified in deception and privacy scenarios. In other
words, if PS adopted the solution concept of [1] to compute
his signaling strategy, then in general he would have faced
the non-trivial cases where he needs to compute the convex
envelope.
The following remark establishes a connection between (26)
and the polyhedral approximations we adopted in Subsection
III-D.
Remark. Based on the definition of inner polyhedral approxi-
mation IP , (19), and the description of K-cone program, (21);
CP(IP) is given by
min
λ∈R|VP|+
tr
∑
b∈VP
λbbb
′V¯
 s.t. ∑
b∈VP
λbb(b
′1) = p
o
, (29)
which is equivalent to
min
λ∈R|VP|+
∑
b∈VP
cbλb s.t.
∑
b∈VP
bλb = po, (30)
where cb := tr
{
bb′V¯
}
. The resemblance between (26) and
(30) is notable. Particularly, a discretization of the simplex
∆(Z) in (26) would have led to (30). This yields that if we just
seek to solve (26) directly via an LP solver after discretizing
the simplex ∆(Z), then it could approximate the optimal
signaling cost only from above and it would not be possible
to quantify the approximation error and adapt the quality
of polyhedral approximations without the outer polyhedral
approximation described in Subsection III-D, which plays an
important role in speeding up the algorithm.
B. A (Continuous) LP Based on Incentive-Compatibility
Suppose that PR has a finite action set (denoted by U , i.e.,
|U| < ∞), even though it is not the case in our problem
setting. For such cases, in [13], the authors have made the
observation that without loss of generality PS could adopt a
direct recommendation scheme in which he recommends only
incentive-compatible actions u ∈ U to PR such that PR’s best
response is to always follow the recommendation.
7Let cS(u, z) and cR(u, z) denote the costs for PS and PR,
respectively, when the underlying state is z and PR takes the
action u. Correspondingly, a signal u is incentive-compatible
provided that∑
z∈Z
po(z)pi(u|z)cR(u, z) ≤
∑
z∈Z
po(z)pi(u|z)cR(u˜, z) (IC)
for all u˜ ∈ U . Then the optimization problem faced by PS
could be written as
minpi∈Π
∑
z∈Z
∑
u∈U po(z)pi(u|z)cS(u, z)
s.t.
∑
u∈U pi(u|z)ds = 1, ∀ z ∈ Z
pi(u|z) ≥ 0, ∀ z ∈ Z and u ∈ U
(IC) holds for all u, u˜ ∈ U .
(31)
Note that (31) is an LP whose numbers of optimization ar-
guments and constraints are polynomial in the size of the state
space and PR’s action space, i.e., |Z| and |U|, respectively.
This yields that there exists an algorithm that can solve it with
run-time complexity polynomial in the size of the state space
and PR’s action space. Since PR’s action space is a continuum
in our problem setting (particularly it is the convex hull of the
state space as can be seen in (10)), here it is not possible
to adopt (31) directly to compute optimal signaling strategies
even for small-size finite state spaces.
For example, if we extend (31) to scenarios where PR has
a continuum action set (e.g., by defining a proper measur-
able signaling strategy and incentive-compatibility constraint,
which necessitates more involved analysis), then (31) turns
into a continuous LP. Alternatively, let us also consider the sce-
narios where boundedly rational PS quantizes the continuum
action set of PR, e.g., uniformly, to a finite number of quanta
to adopt (31) while computing his signaling strategy. However,
smaller approximation error necessitates excess number of
quanta, which corresponds to excessive computational load to
solve the associated LP even when the state space is finite
and small. Furthermore, the associated LP does not bound the
original optimization problem from below since the relaxation
is not with respect to the constraints on the optimization
arguments quite contrary to the cases in the SDP-relaxation
and the quantization of the continuum state space examined
in Subsections III-C and III-E, respectively.
C. An SDP for Gaussian Distributions
Let us take another look at the optimization problem faced
by PS when players have state-dependent quadratic cost mea-
sures, as described in (7), which shows that the signaling strat-
egy has an impact on the optimization objective only through
the correlation matrix of the posterior estimate, E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
. In
[4], the author has identified the necessary conditions on
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
as
E {zz ′}  E{zˆzˆ ′}  E {z}E {z}′ , (32)
where the upper (or lower) bound corresponds to the scenario
where PS sends full (or null) signal. Note that (32) is a linear
matrix inequality while the optimization objective in (7) is a
TABLE I: Joint distribution in Scenario I.
Scenario I.
Evidence Suggests
(G) x = −1 (I) x = 1
Prosecutor
Thinks (G) y = −1 0.3 0.7
TABLE II: Joint distribution in Scenario II.
Scenario II.
Evidence Suggests
(G) x = −1 (I) x = 1
Prosecutor
Thinks
(I) y = 1 0.1 0.4
(G) y = −1 0.2 0.3
linear function of E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
. Correspondingly, [4] has presented
an SDP relaxation of (7) given by
minS∈Sn+ tr {SV }
s.t. E {zz ′}  S  E {z}E {z}′ . (33)
This relaxation (33) turns out to be tight if z is a (multivariate)
Gaussian random variable, as shown in [4], whereas it is not
tight in general for other distributions, as shown in [9]. Further-
more, (33) depends only on the second-order statistics of the
underlying distribution whereas our SDP-relaxation depends
on the probability distribution and is tight for state spaces of
size 4 or less, independent of the underlying distribution.
In the following section, we compare the performance of
these solution concepts with ours over various numerical
examples.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
Similar to the example introduced in [1], let us consider
the interaction between a prosecutor (PS) and a judge (PR)
during a trial of a defendant. Particularly, now the prosecutor
has access to
• the information of interest x ∈ X corresponding to the
status of a defendant based on some evidence
• the private information y ∈ Y corresponding to the
prosecutor’s intuition about the status of the defendant
Irrespective of the evidence, our self-confident and righteous
prosecutor seeks to induce the judge to perceive the status
of the defendant in line with his intuition. On the other side,
the judge is only interested in what the evidence says about
the status of the defendant. We first consider three scenarios
where the underlying joint distributions over the prosecutor’s
intuition and what the evidence suggests about the defendant’s
status are chosen arbitrarily as tabulated in Tables I, II, and III,
where (I), (NG), and (G) correspond to the status of ‘innocent’,
‘not guilty’, and ‘guilty’, respectively. We will examine our
solution concept in a relatively larger state space in Scenario
IV later in this section.
Analogously, we can view prosecutor, defendant, and judge,
respectively, as a sensor, a plant, and a controller (or an
estimator) in a (non-cooperative) multi-agent system. Then the
sensor would report the status of the plant strategically in order
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Fig. 2: Computation of the minimum cost for PS via sequential inner and outer polyhedral approximations within the context
of deception. Similar convergence behavior is observed within the context of privacy.
TABLE III: Joint distribution in Scenario III.
Scenario III.
Evidence Suggests
(G) x = −1 (NG) x = 0 (I) x = 1
Prosecutor
Thinks
(I) y = 1 0.05 0.05 0.1
(NG) y = 0 0.05 0.15 0.1
(G) y = −1 0.2 0.2 0.1
to induce the controller to perceive the status in a certain way
(e.g., to deceive the controller) while the controller would only
be interested in learning the plant’s status.
Note that in Scenario I, the prosecutor’s intuition always
says that the defendant is guilty, which can also be viewed
as the prosecutor always seeks for conviction similar to the
example studied in [1]. However, this differs from the example
in [1] in terms of the cost measures, and therefore also the
result is different. The cost of PS when PR has the belief[
1− µ µ]′, where µ := P{z = [−1 −1]′}, is given by
cˆS(µ) = 4µ
2 − 8µ+ 3, (34)
which is a convex function. Note that even though tr
{
V¯ pp′
}
is a non-convex function of p, it turns out to be a convex
function over the unit simplex under the specific settings of this
example. However, as observed in the following examples, this
is not always the case. Furthermore, as characterized in [1],
since cˆS(·) is a convex function, null signaling is the optimal
one in Scenario I. Alternatively, we have its convex envelope
C(µ) = cˆS(µ) and the minimum cost for PS is given by
C(µ) = cˆS(µo) = 0.96, where µo is the prior probability of[−1 −1]′, i.e., 0.3.
On the other hand, in Scenarios II and III, the associated
cost of PS for a given posterior belief of PR does not end
up being a convex function. The dimensions of freedom to
select the posterior are 3 and 8, respectively, in Scenarios II
and III. Therefore, in order to apply the same solution concept,
we need to compute the convex envelope of some non-convex
functions defined over R3 and R8, instead of R as we do
in Scenario I. However, through the proposed framework,
we can efficiently compute the minimum cost for PS and
TABLE IV: A table of E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}
for different signaling
strategies in Scenarios I-III within the context of deception
Scenario (# of States) I (2) II (4) III (9)
Null Signaling 0.96 0.16 0
Full Signaling 1.8 0.6 0.3
LP-25 in [13] 0.9615 -0.4625 -0.376
(output) (0.8465) (-0.625) (-0.5299)
LP-100 in [13] 0.96 -0.4646 -0.4128
(output) (0.9319) (-0.5461) (-0.4933)
Optimal Signaling 0.96 -0.4715 -0.4283
Our SDP-relaxation 0.96 -0.4715 -0.4283
SDP-relaxation in [4] 0.96 -0.5411 -0.4550
the associated optimal signaling strategies in those scenarios
conclusively.
In Table IV, we tabulate the results.14 Proposition 3 says
that the SDP-relaxation and the primal problem are equivalent
for n ≤ 4, as also seen in Table IV. We also note that the SDP-
relaxation has turned out to be a tight lower bound in Scenario
III, where n = 9. In Fig. 2, we illustrate the convergence
behavior of the solutions of the inner and outer polyhedral
approximations across the iterations. Note that with the in-
crease of the size of the state space, the corresponding number
of iterations necessary for convergence increase significantly
while the computational complexity of each iteration increases
further with an increase in the size of the state space.
In Table IV, we also tabulate the results obtained via the
existing methods that are explained in detail in Subsections
IV-B and IV-C. For example LP-25 and LP-100 correspond to
E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}
attained for signaling strategies computed via (31)
when the receiver’s action space is quantized uniformly into 25
and 100 bins, respectively, while the values in parentheses are
the associated minimum attained in (31). As expected, finer
14In null, full, and optimal signaling, E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}
is, respectively, equal to
tr
{
V¯ p
o
p′
o
}
, tr
{
V¯ diag
{
p
o
}}
, and tr
{
V¯ Ξ∗
}
. Furthermore, we use the
solvers provided by [28], [29] at an ordinary personal computer in order to
solve the associated LPs and SDPs.
9TABLE V: A table of E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}
for different signaling strate-
gies in Scenarios I-III but now within the context of privacy
Scenario (# of States) I (2) II (4) III (9)
Null Signaling 0.84 -0.16 0.09
Full Signaling 0 0 0.1
LP-25 in [13] 0 -0.9167 -0.4469
(output) (0) (-0.975) (-0.4983)
LP-100 in [13] 0 -0.9432 -0.4625
(output) (0) (-0.9531) (-0.4691)
Optimal Signaling 0 -0.9583 -0.4707
Our SDP-relaxation 0 -0.9583 -0.4707
SDP-relaxation in [4] 0 -0.9780 -0.4911
TABLE VI: A table of E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}
for full and null signaling
in comparison to the lower bounds obtained via the SDP-
relaxations within the context of deception
Scenario (# of States) IV (100)
Null Signaling 0.0146
Full Signaling 0.25
LP-100 in [13] (Output) -0.2213 (-0.2822)
Our SDP-relaxation -0.2365
SDP-relaxation in [4] -0.2416
granularity quantization, e.g., 100 bins in comparison to 25
bins, leads to smaller approximation error. Although solving
the LP, described in (31), in the scenarios where the receiver
has more than 100 actions pushes the limit of computational
capabilities of an ordinary computer, even LP-100 could not
compute the optimal signaling strategies with a negligible error
when state space has sizes 4 and 9. Furthermore the outcomes
of the SDP-relaxation in [4], as described in (33), are not tight
in Scenarios II and III, contrary to our SDP-relaxation.
We have also analyzed the cost of PS within the context
of privacy over Scenarios I-III. We have tabulated the results
in Table V. Similar to the previous case, we can apply the
solution process introduced in [1] to this problem for Scenario
I. Correspondingly, the cost of PS when PR has the belief[
1− µ µ]′, where µ := P{z = [−1 −1]′}, is now given
by
cˆS(µ) = −4µ2 + 4µ, (35)
which is a concave function. As characterized in [1], since
cˆS(·) is a concave function, we can conclude that full signaling
is the optimal one in Scenario I. Alternatively, a geometrical
inspection yields that the convex envelope of cˆS(µ) is given by
C(µ) = 0, which coincides with the cost for the full signaling
case as expected. We also note that in Scenario III, the output
of LP-100 is larger than the optimal cost, which exemplifies
that (31) accompanied with a quantization of the receiver’s
action set does not bound the optimal cost from below.
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Fig. 3: Joint distribution over the state space of size 100 in
which what evidence suggests and what the prosecutor thinks
are scaled into 10 uniform bins from “Innocent” to “Guilty”
Finally we compare our SDP-relaxation with the SDP-
relaxation in [4] and the LP formulation in [13] for a 100-bin
(uniform) quantization of the receiver’s/judge’s action space
in Scenario IV where the size of the state space is 100. For
example, we set the state space and the joint distribution by
interpolating the configuration in Scenario III. In Fig. 3, we
plot the joint distribution over the state space. And in Table
VI, we tabulate the results. We note that −0.2213 is the value
of E
{
zˆ ′V zˆ
}
associated with the signaling strategy computed
via LP-100. Therefore it can be viewed as an upper bound on
the minimum cost. On the other hand, our SDP-relaxation is
a lower bound on the minimum cost and again appears tight
in comparison to the SDP-relaxation in [4].
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have addressed the Bayesian persuasion problem with
state-dependent quadratic cost measures for arbitrary distribu-
tions with finite support. This problem setting has applications,
e.g., varying from deception to privacy, in multi-agent (non-
cooperative) systems. However, it is challenging to compute
optimal signaling strategies or optimal signaling cost via
existing solution concepts effectively even for distributions that
have support over a small state space, since the associated
optimization problem turns out to be highly nonlinear and
non-convex. To mitigate this issue, we have formulated an
equivalent linear optimization problem over the cone of com-
pletely positive matrices by exploiting the quadratic structure
of the cost measures and showed that its (strong) dual is
a linear optimization problem over the cone of copositive
matrices. Then we have exemplified how one can adopt the
existing solution methods on copositive programming to solve
the optimization problem effectively, and we have examined its
performance over various scenarios numerically. We have also
quantified the approximation error for a quantized version of a
continuous distribution and provided an SDP relaxation of the
optimization problem, which can be solved for relatively larger
state spaces and therefore can be used as a benchmark lower
bound for the minimum signaling cost in signaling problems
with large (or continuous) state spaces.
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Some of the future research directions include development
of computational tools specific to the configuration of the
equivalent problem, characterization of the hardness of the
signaling problem, and its generalization to dynamic and/or
noisy settings with multiple senders and/or multiple receivers.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Claim 1. For any signaling rule pi ∈ Π, Ξpi ∈ Sn satisfies
• Ξpi ∈ CPn,
• Ξpi1 = po,
where p
o
:=
[
po(z1) . . . po(zn)
]′
.
Proof. We can decompose Ξpi ∈ Sn, as described in (15), as
Ξpi = AA
′, where
A :=
ps1(z1)p(s1)
1/2 · · · psk(z1)p(sk)1/2
...
...
ps1(zn)p(s1)
1/2 · · · psk(zn)p(sk)1/2
 , (36)
which is clearly a nonnegative matrix since all the entries are
products of (nonnegative) probability measures. This yields
that Ξpi ∈ CPn.
For a given signaling rule pi ∈ Π, let So ⊆ S denote the set
of signals that PS sends with positive probability, i.e., p(s) >
0 for all s ∈ So. Then, the sum of entries of Ξpi at the ith row
is given by
n∑
j=1
Ξpi[i, j]
(a)
=
∑
s∈So
p(s)ps(zi)
=1︷ ︸︸ ︷
n∑
j=1
ps(zj), (37)
(b)
=
∑
s∈So
p(s)
pi(s|zi)po(zi)
p(s)
, (38)
= po(zi)
∑
s∈So
pi(s|zi), (39)
(c)
= po(zi), (40)
where (a) follows from (9) and (10), (b) follows from (9), and
(c) follows since pi(·|z) ∈ ∆(S). By (40), we have Ξpi1 = po,
which completes the proof of the claim. 
Claim 2. For any completely positive matrix Ξ ∈ CPn that
satisfies Ξ1 = p
o
, there exists a signaling rule pi ∈ Π such
that Ξpi = Ξ, where Ξpi ∈ CPn is as described in (15).
Proof. Consider any completely positive matrix Ξ ∈ CPn
that satisfies Ξ1 = p
o
. By the definition of completely positive
matrices, we can decompose Ξ ∈ CPn into Ξ = BB′, where
B =
[
b1 . . . bk
] ∈ Rn×k+ (41)
is some nonnegative matrix. We note that the decomposi-
tion is not necessarily a unique one [17]. For example, by
padding zero columns into B, we can generate infinitely many
decompositions. Correspondingly, we assume, without loss
of generality, that in the decomposition of Ξ ∈ CPn, the
nonnegative matrix B ∈ Rn×k+ does not have an all zero
column, i.e., bi 6= 0 for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Recall that for any given signaling rule pi ∈ Π, we can
decompose Ξpi = AA′, where the matrix A ∈ Rn×|S|+ is as
described in (36). Correspondingly, if we can show that there
exists a signaling rule pi ∈ Π such that A = B, then this
would imply that Ξ = Ξpi for that signaling rule. To this end,
we let |S| = k, and introduce auxiliary vectors
pii :=
[
pi(si|z1) . . . pi(si|zn)
]′
, (42)
which, by (10), yields that p(si) = pi′ipo. Therefore, by
substituting (9) in (36), we can write the matrix A as
A = Po
[ pi1√
pi′1po
. . .
pik√
pi′kpo
]
, (43)
where Po := diag{po}, which is nonsingular since the prior
distribution po has complete support on Z . Correspondingly,
A would be equal to B provided that
Popii√
pi′ipo
= bi, ∀i = 1, . . . , k, (44)
and it can be verified that we have (44) if
pii = b
′
i1P
−1
o bi. (45)
However, we also need to inspect the validity of (45) as a
signaling rule, i.e., whether pi(·|z) ∈ ∆(S) for each z ∈ Z or
not. To this end, we focus on the equivalent conditions that
pi(s|z) for all s ∈ S and z ∈ Z , and ∑s∈S pi(s|z) = 1 for
each z ∈ Z . The former condition is satisfied by the definition,
since bi is a column of the nonnegative matrix B ∈ Rn×k+ .
Verification of the latter condition is relatively more involved.
To this end, let us introduce
Π :=
[
pi1 . . . pik
]
. (46)
Then, the latter constraint is equivalent to Π1 = 1, i.e., the
sum of columns of Π is an all 1s vector. If we set pii as in
(45), then we would obtain
Π =
[
(b′11)P
−1
o b1 . . . (b
′
k1)P
−1
o bn
]
, (47)
and correspondingly the sum of columns of Π is given by
Π1 = P−1o
k∑
i=1
bi(b
′
i1). (48)
Note that (b′i1)P
−1
o bi = P
−1
o bi(b
′
i1) since b
′
i1 is just a scalar.
Recall that the completely positive matrix Ξ ∈ CPn satisfies
Ξ1 = p
o
, which can also be written as
BB′1 = p
o
⇔
k∑
i=1
bib
′
i1 = po. (49)
Therefore, by (48) and (49), we obtain Π1 = P−1o po = 1,
and correspondingly (45) is a valid signaling strategy, which
completes the proof of the claim. 
Based on (16), Claims 1 and 2 yield (18), and (17) follows
from (45), which completes the proof.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
In the following we first formulate the dual problem, and
then show the strong duality.
Part i) Dual Problem. As pointed out in [27, Chapter 4.7],
given a primal cone program:
max
x
〈c, x〉 s.t. b−A(x) ∈ L and x ∈ K, (50)
where K,L are cones and A(·) is a linear operator, its dual
program is given by
min
y
〈b, y〉 s.t. AT (y)− c ∈ K∗ and y ∈ L∗, (51)
where AT (·) is the adjoint of the linear operator A(·). Based
on the fact that minx f(x) = maxx−f(x), our primal
problem can be written as
max
Ξ
tr
{
Ξ(−V¯ )} s.t. p
o
− Ξ1 = 0 and Ξ ∈ CPn. (52)
Within the framework of (P), let x = Ξ, c = −V¯ , 〈c, x〉 =
tr
{
cTx
}
, A(Ξ) = Ξ1, b = p
o
, L = {0}, and K = CPn. Note
that
〈y,A(Ξ)〉 = tr{yTΞ1} = tr{1yTΞ} , (53)
which yields that AT (y) = 1yT is an adjoint of the linear
operator A(Ξ) = Ξ1. Furthermore, the dual of the closed
convex cones L = {0} ⊂ Rn and K = CPn ⊂ Sn with
respect to the trace inner product are, respectively, given by
L∗ =
{
y ∈ Rn : tr{yTx} ≥ 0,∀x ∈ L} = Rn (54)
K∗ =
{
y ∈ Sn : tr{yTx} ≥ 0,∀x ∈ K} = COPn. (55)
Therefore, (51) yields that the dual of (52) is given by
min
y
pT
o
y s.t. 1yT + V¯ ∈ COPn and y ∈ Rn, (56)
or equivalently if we set y˜ = −y, we obtain
max
y˜,S
pT
o
y˜ s.t. − 1y˜T + V¯ = S, y˜ ∈ Rn, and S ∈ COPn.
Part ii) Strong Duality. The primal problem is feasible
since the constraint set is not empty based on Claims 1 and 2
in Appendix A.
The fact that the primal problem has finite value follows by
the extreme value theorem since the optimization objective is
linear in the optimization argument and the constraint set
{Ξ ∈ CPn|Ξ1 = p
o
} (57)
is a closed and bounded subset of CPn.
It is relatively more involved to show that the primal prob-
lem entails an interior point. Particularly, a characterization of
the interior of CPn is given by [30, Theorem 3.3]
int {CPn} = {AA′ | rank {A} = n,A = [a A˜]
3 a > 0, A˜ ≥ 0}. (58)
Therefore, the question is whether there exists a Ξ ∈
int {CPn} such that Ξ1 = p
o
.
Based on Claims 1 and 2, let us consider the associated
signaling problem where we set the signal space as S = {so =
∅, s1 = z1, . . . , sn = zn}, and the prior distribution over
Z to have full support, without loss of generality. Consider
the two extreme cases: full disclosure and null disclosure,
respectively, given and denoted by pi(zi) = zi, and pi(zi) = ∅
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Note that for a given signaling strategy
pi ∈ Π, an entry of the associated completely positive matrix
Ξpi is described in (15). Furthermore, a component of a
decomposition of Ξpi is described in (36). Correspondingly,
we obtain
Ξpi = AA
′ 3 A := [0 Po] , (59)
Ξpi = AA
′ 3 A := [p
o
O
]
. (60)
This yields that if PS selects a signaling strategy pi ∈ Π that
discloses z ∈ Z truthfully, i.e., si = zi, with probability λ ∈
(0, 1) and discloses so otherwise, then we obtain
Ξpi = AA
′ 3 A := [(1− λ)p
o
λPo
]
, (61)
in which the first column is a positive vector and rank {A} =
n since po is an all-positive vector, i.e., the prior distribution
has full support over Z by the formulation. This yields that
Ξpi ∈ int {CPn} and Ξpi1 = po.
Since the conditions for the strong duality theorem [27,
Theorem 4.7.1] hold, we have strong duality between the
primal and dual problems, which concludes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
We first note that the following inequality always holds
min
s
tr
{
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
V
} ≤ min
s
tr
{
E
{
zˆqzˆ
′
q
}
V
}
(62)
since any quantization would restrict PS’s strategy space for
continuous distributions.
Let eˆ = zˆ− zˆq for a given signal s, i.e., eˆ = E {e|s}. Then,
for any signal s ∼ Z , we have
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
= E
{
zˆqzˆ
′
q
}
+ E
{
zˆqeˆ
′}+ E{eˆzˆ ′q}+ E{eˆeˆ′} .
Correspondingly, we obtain
min
s
tr
{
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
V
} ≥ min
s
tr
{
E
{
zˆqzˆ
′
q
}
V
}
+ min
s
tr
{
(E
{
zˆqeˆ
′}+ E{eˆzˆ ′q}+ E{eˆeˆ′})V } . (63)
Let us take a closer look at the second term on the right-hand-
side, which can also be written as
−max
s
−tr{(E{zˆqeˆ′}+ E{eˆzˆ ′q}+ E{eˆeˆ′})V } (64)
Then, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for random vectors
yields that (64) is bounded from above by
− 2E{zˆ ′qV eˆ}− E{eˆ′V eˆ} ≤ (2‖zˆq‖+ ‖eˆ‖)‖V ‖2‖eˆ‖,
since ‖−V ‖2 = ‖V ‖2. Note that the right-hand-side depends
on the signal s. However, we also have
‖zq − zˆq‖2 = ‖zq‖2 − ‖zˆq‖2 ≥ 0, (65)
‖e − eˆ‖2 = ‖e‖2 − ‖eˆ‖2 ≥ 0. (66)
Therefore, by (65) and (66), we obtain
− 2E{zˆ ′qV eˆ}− E{eˆ′V eˆ} ≤ (2‖zq‖+ ‖e‖)‖V ‖2‖e‖, (67)
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where, now, the right-hand-side does not depend on the signal.
Therefore, we obtain
 ≥ min
s
tr
{
E
{
zˆqzˆ
′
q
}
V
}−min
s
tr
{
E
{
zˆzˆ ′
}
V
} ≥ 0,
where  is as described in (25), which completes the proof.
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